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Introduction 
In the 19th century, the ideologies developed in Europe appeared in the Middle East as a 
consequence of Napoléon’s campaign in Egypt. During the century one of these ideologies 
became the most dominant thought in the Arab world. The first thinkers and political agita-
tors of nationalism, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani or Mohammed ‘Abdu, recognized the 
cultural threat of the West, focused on the resurgence of Islam and advocated the unity of 
the Islam world. According to al-Afghani’s Pan-Islamism, only the unified Islam world 
would be able to confront Western colonialism.1 
By the end of the 19th century, the decline of the Ottoman Empire made the Arabic-
speaking political thinkers urge to focus on the ethnic and linguistic differences between the 
Arabs and the Turkish. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, who is usually regarded as the pre-
cursor of Arabism or Arab nationalism, emphasised that he resurgence of Islam should be 
necessarily led by the Arab people. He stated that the caliphate should bring back to the He-
jaz and an Arab from the descendants of the Prophet should be elected as caliph.2 Later, 
Sati’ al-Husri, the most significant theorist of Arab nationalism, had already emphasized 
the importance of Arab unity and declared that Islam unity would not a realistic prospect.3 
On the eve of World War I, Arab nationalism became a very popular movement in the 
Middle East and the Arab leaders utilised some of its elements to their political goals 
against the Ottomans. 
Sharif Hussein, who was appointed as Emir of Mecca by the Ottoman Sultan right after 
the Young Turk revolution, 1908, had secret relations with the British during World War I. 
The correspondence between Sharif Hussein and High Commissioner Henry McMahon 
contains Britain’s misty promise about a future Arab Khalifate that would have involved 
the whole Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent (without Egypt).4 Finally, Hussein, 
who hoped that he could establish the long-dreamed khalifate after the war, launched the 
Arab Revolt in 1916 against the Ottomans supported by the British. 
However, the Great Powers had already decided to divide the Middle Eastern territories 
of the Ottoman Empire among each other5 and had never had the intention to let an inde-
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pendent Arab Khalifate be established. After the World War ended, the Great Power re-
shaped the map of the Middle East by establishing new Arab states. According to the newly 
formulated Mandate system, that was based upon the Syk s-Picot Agreement, Syria and 
Lebanon became French Mandate, and Britain received Palestine and Iraq. 
Winston Churchill, Britain’s secretary for the colonies, called upon the Cairo Confe-
rence in March 1921 to lay down the principles of Britain’s Middle Eastern policy. Brit-
ain’s primary strategic goal was to ensure the route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Per-
sian Gulf, hence they decided to create a buffer state, and carved out Transjordan, the land 
beyond the River Jordan, from the Mandate of Palestin . Emir Abdallah, the second son of 
Sharif Hussein, was appointed as Emir of Transjordan. Thus, the Great Powers created the 
basis of the future nation-state system in the Middle East, which also meant that they sowed 
the seeds of regional nationalism.6 
The Emirate of Transjordan 
Before World War I, nobody could find a land called Transjordan and the people, who 
lived on that land, had never identified themselves as Transjordanians. This area was part of 
the Ottoman Empire with largely Bedouin inhabitants lived mostly in tribes who kept a few 
contacts with the Ottoman administration. Only the north-western residents had everyday 
relations with the larger towns of Damascus and Nablus, the southern tribes looked toward 
the Hijaz. No national movement, therefore, had emerged in the tribal society before the 
World War.7 
In the moment of the creation of Transjordan, it was a poor, backward, and ungover-
nable country. Only the north-western part of the desert country was available for agri-
cultural production, and the harvest largely depended on the annual rainfall. The inhabitants 
were divided among numerous semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes, only a little part of the popu-
lation lived settled lifestyle in the Ajlun region i the north. The rivalry between the tribes 
was part of the everyday life and the individuals’ sense of social identity determined by 
tribal affiliation. Social services, like education and health services, were almost non-
existent, and illiteracy was extremely high.8 
During the post-war negotiations between Britain and the local leaders, the latter in-
sisted on having a high-ranking Arab leader as head of a new state. In my opinion this indi-
cates that the inhabitants of the future Emirate started to think in more nationalistic terms.9 
Emir Abdallah seemed the right candidate for this po ition. He was one of the members of 
the Hashemite family, so he was a direct descendant the Prophet Mohammed. Traditionally, 
the Ottomans always appointed a Hashemite as Emir of Mecca throughout the centuries. 
During the Arab Revolt, Abdallah stayed in the Hijaz and tried to restrain the Saudi expan-
sion, but his troops were defeated in two battles in 1919 that Abdallah barely survived the 
campaign. Shortly after that he probably decided to leave the Hijaz, but he was waiting for 
the right time, the time when his brother, Emir Feisal, had to escape from Damascus in 
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summer 1920.10 Abdallah reached Ma’an (an important town in the southern part of 
Transjordan) in the late autumn 1920 with some 2.000 armed men. In Ma’an he tried to 
earn the local leaders’ support and came into contat with British diplomats, too. His arrival 
coincided with Britain’s need to decide the future of their Mandates. Since the local leaders 
warmly welcomed and supported Abdallah after his arriv l in Amman, Secretary Churchill 
invited the Emir to Jerusalem at the end of March 1921 and appointed him as Emir of 
Transjordan. 
At first Transjordan played the role of a buffer state and military base between Pales-
tine, Iraq and the Saudi territories. For this purpose, the British created the Arab Legion led 
and educated by British army officers. By the mid-1920s, Transjordan concluded the nego-
tiations with Abdel Aziz ibn Saud on the southern borders of Transjordan. In 1928, Britain 
and Transjordan signed the Anglo–Transjordanian Treaty that laid down the rights and ob-
ligations of the Emir and the relation between the two states. The same year the newly es-
tablished Transjordanian Parliament adopted the Organic Law functioned as a constitution. 
Hence, the process of making a state finished just at the end of the 1920s.11 
Transjordanian Nationalism vs Hashimite Pan-Arabism 
As I mentioned before, the reshaping of the map of the Middle East created the possi-
bility of the development of regional nationalisms. By the end of the 1920s, Transjordan 
drew its border lines and “those who came within the boundaries of the Jordanian state be-
came potential citizens of the nation”.12 Through the years of the Mandate, however, the 
development of the sense of Transjordanian identity was a slow process. 
Firstly, the society of Transjordan was mostly tribal, and the inhabitants’ identity tied to 
their tribe. Moreover, there were no any nationalist leaders in the country before, the only 
demand of the Transjordanian towns (such as Kerak, S lt) was the appointment of an Arab 
prince as Emir of the new state at the end of 1920, as it was mentioned before. It was a hard 
task to create a new national identity instead of tribal identity. Emir Abdallah solved this 
problem by nominating the tribal leaders (the sheiks) to high government and administra-
tive positions. Unavoidably, these government officials began to identify themselves natio-
nally Transjordanian.13 Thus, the borders drawn and the state institutes created in the 1920s, 
in one word, the making of the Transjordanian state was one of the supra-tribal institutes 
that paved the way for the national identity. 
Another component was the Emir himself, who was not a Transjordanian14 but gained 
his legitimacy from the origin of his family and the Arab Revolt. For the local sheikhs, he 
was “a revered chief who deserved their loyalty andsubmission”.15 
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appointed as Emir of Mecca, Abdallah became representative of the Hijaz in the Ottoman parliament. 




The Arab Legion was also a supra-tribal structure. The British and Abdallah established 
this army in 1923 to defend Britain’s strategic interest and the integrity of the state. The 
Legion was commanded and trained by British army officers from the beginning, but the 
core of the army consisted of Arab officers and soldiers of many different origins (Leba-
nese, Syrian, Transjordanian, Palestinian, and Hijazi), most of them served in Emir Feisal’s 
army in Damascus before his dismissal. However, Britain put pressure on the Emir to re-
move these nationalist members from the Legion and increase its number with local tribes-
men. When Major John Glubb16 arrived in Transjordan in 1930, he created the Desert Pa-
trol within the Arab Legion in order to protect the boundaries and oil pipeline connecting 
Kirkuk and Haifa. This group that later reorganized as Desert Mechanized Force consisted 
only Bedouins and played a significant role in protecting internal security. Hence, the Arab 
Legion became one of the essential pillars of the sate of Transjordan. Besides, it was also 
active in making a sense of Transjordanian identity by incorporating the tribes into the state 
structures. The Bedouins, who served in the Legion, began to identify themselves as Tran-
sjordanian.17 
Overall, these three supra-tribal institutes (the state, the Emir, and the Arab Legion) 
formed the basis of the Transjordanian national ident ty. Although, Emir Abdallah had 
never committed himself to Transjordanian nationalism because he had large-scale Middle 
Eastern ambitions: to create Greater Syria. His entire political thought that could be called 
Hashemite Pan-Arabism, based on the future unity of the Middle Eastern Arab states (Pal-
estine, Transjordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria). Abdallah could rely on the Arab Legion, that 
was not only playing a role in defending internal security but also symbolized the political 
power of the Emir.18 Hence, Emir Abdallah hindered the growth of Transjordanian nation-
alism since he focused on his Pan-Arab ambitions, moreover, to emphasize his commit-
ment, he had never appointed any politician of Transjordanian origin as prime minister.19 
Abdallah looked toward Palestine as a first step to unify the Arab states. Although 
drawing the international border between Palestine and Transjordan in the 1920s caused the 
beginning of the division of the people. The roots f Palestinian national identity, of course, 
had already appeared but the connection between the two states was still strong during the 
Mandate. On the one hand, both countries were under the British Mandate, and the two ad-
ministrations always cooperated. The Transjordanian British resident was dependent on the 
High Commissioner in Palestine. Moreover, Palestinian officials were often appointed to 
the Transjordanian administration as well. Emir Abdallah’s ambitions toward Palestine also 
strengthened the Palestinian–Transjordanian relations. The Emir built strong political con-
nections with prominent Palestinians, chiefly those who did not agree with Grand Mufti 
                                                                                                                 
15 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, 18. 
16 John Bagot Glubb is a British army officer who served in the Western Front during World War I. In 
1920, he was sent to Iraq, and then, in 1930 arrived in Transjordan where he founded the Desert Pa-
trol within the Arab Legion. This group consisted of bedouins. In 1939, he was appointed as com-
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18 Massad, Joseph A., Colonial Effects, 223.; Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, 17. 
19 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, 20. 
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Amin al-Husseini’s20 policy. On the other hand, the two people of the countries looked at 
each other as Arab brothers. The Transjordanian people supported the Palestinian oppo-
sition to Zionism and tried to send them arms and money during the Arab Rebellion in the 
1930s, but the Arab Legion hindered it, even the Transjordanian government, as an ally of 
the British Mandatory system, arrested Palestinian insurgents.21 
During the Arab Rebellion, the report of the Palestine Royal Commission, as known as 
the Peel Commission, appreciated Abdallah’s role in Palestine. The commission suggested 
the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan22 under the reign of Emir Abd-
allah who immediately urged the British government to establish “a unified Arab kingdom 
composed of Palestine and Transjordan under royal Arab rule”.23 However, Abdallah had to 
wait ten more years. 
Ten years later, in 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted its famous parti-
tion plan. Transjordan in the meantime became an independent state, and Abdallah pro-
claimed himself as king. After the adoption of the partition plan, King Abdallah initiated 
negotiations with the British and the Jewish Agency as well, to win their support. 
In February 1948, Abdallah sent his prime minister and Glubb to negotiate with Britain. 
Abdallah needed open support from the British to take control over the Arab part of Pales-
tine after the evacuation of British forces. Britain, in theory, stood by Abdallah’s plan and 
warned him about the vacuum of power when Britain would leave the area. 
Abdallah also had secret negotiations with the Jewish Agency. The king assured Golda 
Meir that he supported the partition plan. Both parties opposed to the possible establish-
ment of a Palestinian state and looked at Grand Mufti al-Husseini as a common enemy. 
However, Abdallah thought that the establishment of the Jewish state was still too early and 
suggested her a peaceful settlement. According to Abdallah, an undivided Palestinian state 
should be created, where the Arab Legion would ensure internal security and the Jews 
would have autonomy. Within a year this state would nify with Transjordan, and Jews 
would receive the half of seats in the Parliament and  not-determined number of seats in 
the cabinet. In Abdallah’s opinion, they could have voided the outbreak of the war.24 The 
Jewish Agency, however, was to create a Jewish state, so, at the end of the meeting, Abdal-
lah assured Meir that, after the war broke out, the op rations of the Arab Legion would not 
touch Jewish territories. 
There was a third factor Abdallah wanted to stand o his side: the newly formed Arab 
League, the loose confederation of the Arab countries established in 1945. Its decision-
making process was slow and depended on the different ambitions and the interests of the 
members. After long negotiations, Abdallah won the majority of the League, and in April 
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1948, Abdallah was appointed as namely general commander of the all-Arab expeditionary 
forces.25 
When the first Arab-Israeli war broke out on 15th May 1948, the Arab Legion, alongside 
with the Iraqi army, invaded the Arab territories of Palestine as a first step toward an-
nexation. The situation, though, was more complicated. Abdallah considered himself the 
only who represented the Palestinians, but his opposition, that was supported by especially 
Egypt, established in September 1948 the General Palestine Government. It called upon a 
conference in Gaza in order to gain the support of the Palestinians. However, Abdallah 
convened another conference in Amman at the same tie and, using the military situation 
in Palestine, prevented and/or forced the Palestinian delegates to go to Gaza, but to Am-
man. The Amman conference adopted a resolution that Abdallah had “full and absolute au-
thority to speak on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine” and he was their representative. How-
ever, it was only a prelude before the Jericho Conference on 1st December 1948. Some 
2.000 Palestinian delegates participated at the confere ce that called for a Palestinian–
Jordanian unity on its resolution and declared Abdallah as “king of all Palestine”.26 
The war ended by singing Armistice Agreements betwen Israel and the Arab states in 
the spring of 1949. According to the Israeli–Transjordanian Armistice Agreement, Trans-
jordan kept authority over the Arab areas of Palestin , also called as the West Bank. This 
area was smaller than determined in the UN partition plan, because Israel, using its military 
and political advantages, increased its territory. One year later, the Jordanian Parliament 
officially annexed the West Bank. The state was renamed as the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan that symbolized the beginning of a new era. 
The struggle of the three ideologies 
As a consequence of the first Arab-Israeli war and the unification of the two banks of 
Jordan, the population of the kingdom rose to approximately 1.270.000 people. At the end 
of the 1940s, Transjordan had 375.000 inhabitants, while the West Bank had 425.000. Dur-
ing and after the war, however, almost 360.000 refug es entered the West Bank from the 
areas occupied by Israel, and another 110.000 refuge s arrived to Transjordan (East 
Bank).27 This posed demographic, socio-economic, and even id ological challenges for the 
state. 
The Palestinians received Jordanian citizenship and the right to vote which was the po-
litical-ideological basis of the unity of the two banks.28 However, the seats in the Jordanian 
Parliament divided equally between the East and West Bank; in other words, the 375.000 
Transjordanian had also 20 seats like 900.000 Palestinians.29 In the mind of the state, every 
citizen of the Kingdom was Jordanian; it did not matter which bank they live in. In the po-
litical dialogue and the textbooks, there was no reference to Palestinians.30 It was the es-
sence of Pan-Jordanism, or Pan-Jordanian nationalism: “The state’s goal was less to impose 
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on Palestinians a Transjordanian identity than to create a hybrid Jordanian identity for both 
communities.”31 
Through the next two decades, in the 1960s and 1970s, an ideological struggle took 
place between Pan-Jordanism, Palestinian nationalism, and Pan-Arabism. Jordanian iden-
tity, in practice, “meant a simultaneous cooperation and repression of an independent Pales-
tinian identity”32 that based on not only the land of Palestine but the trauma of the loss of 
homeland and injustice.33 In the early 1950s, most of the Palestinians could accept their 
new status as Jordanian citizens but, of course, they were not satisfied with their situation.34 
They did not identify themselves as Jordanian and looked at King Abdallah as a traitor. 
Through the years, the sense of Palestinian identity formed, and those who identify them-
selves as Palestinian divide into three groups. According to this, those Arabs who stayed 
within the Armistice Lines after the first Arab-Israeli war and lived in Israel; those who 
lived in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank occupied by Israel in 1967; and those who left 
homes after the wars and live as refugees could be regarded as Palestinian.35 
Until the early 1960s Palestinian nationalists stood by Pan-Arabism as well, so it is hard 
to separate these two ideologies. Pan-Arabism had risen in the 1950s and merged with the 
person of the Egyptian President. Gamal Abd el-Nasser became one the most significant 
Middle Eastern politicians referred as the unofficial leader of Pan-Arabism. The political 
struggle between Nasser and the Hashemite monarchy was a determining factor of this pe-
riod called the Arab Cold War.36 After the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganisation (PLO) in 1964, the growth of Palestinian n tional consciousness accelerated, and 
after the Six-Day War, which was another trauma for the Arab world, Palestinian iden-tity 
definitely separated from Jordanianness. Even, Palestinian nationalism constituted one of 
the greatest threats to security, peace and the reign of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. 
What were the main political events, main ruptures of the struggle between Jordanians 
and Palestinians? The first event occured one year afte  the annexation of the West Bank, 
when King Abdallah was assassinated by a young Palestinian in 1951 in Jerusalem. This 
was the first symbolic sign that Palestinians were not satisfied with their situation in Jordan. 
Jordanian citizens (the East Bankers) could never forgive this murder to the Palestinians. It 
was even thought that Amin al-Husseini ordered the assassination. Nevertheless, the monar-
chy continued to propagate its ‘two banks, one people’ ideology. 
In the mid-1950s, the young King Hussein37 had to face the challenge of the rise of 
radical Pan-Arab nationalism. His nationalist oppositi n demanded to break Jordan’s rela-
tions with Britain. In March 1956, he dismissed John Glubb and all British officers from 
the Arab Legion, and the intelligence. The king hadpersonal conflict with Glubb about the 
leadership of the army and state, and Hussein wanted to assert his personal authority in Jor-
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dan.38 Hussein thought that he could hinder to a further rise of Pan-Arab nationalism in Jor-
dan, but even so, the radical nationalist parties won the October elections, and Suleiman 
Nabulsi became prime minister of Jordan. Nabulsi was the leader of the National Socialist 
Party in Jordan and was an admirer of President Nasser. Nabulsi followed Nasser’s Pan-
Arab policy, cancelled the treaty with Britain and established political relations with the 
Soviet Union. King Hussein realized that the Nabulsi Government constituted a threat to 
the Hashemite monarchy, that was the reason why he dismissed Nabulsi in April 1957 and 
banned all political parties in Jordan and arrested most of the radical politicians. Jordan’s 
new Western political ally, the United States, on the basis of the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
helped to rebuilt political stability in the country. The events of 1956 and 1957 made Pales-
tinians more unsatisfied that increased the gap between them and Jordanians. 
In the 1960s, the Palestinian national identity developed rapidly. The PLO gained in-
creased significance after the Six-Day War. Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip 
and the Golan Heights, which made the Palestinians disappointed in Pan-Arab nationalism 
and made them recognize the necessity of establishing t eir own Palestinian state. That 
strengthened the development of Palestinian nationalism. During the war, some 300.000 
refugees crossed over the River Jordan, caused socio-economic and political challenges for 
King Hussein. Through the next years, numerous Palestinian armed branches (some of that 
were members of the PLO) took control over a large part of Jordan. Finally, in 1970, King 
Hussein decided to expel PLO from Jordan (the so-called Black September). 
Ideologically, the status of Jordanians with Palestinian origin was uncertain. They were 
loyal to the state of Jordan and the Hashemite monarchy, and many of them served in the 
Jordanian army. According to some accounts, the percentage of Palestinian in the military 
was between 45 and 60 per cent.39 Anyway, Jordan gave up propagating the hybrid ide-
ology of Pan-Jordanism, and Transjordanian nationalsm rose again. Abu-Odeh emphasizes 
that Transjordanian nationalists had an aggressive attitude toward the Palestinians and 
looked at them as strangers.40 However, a good portion of the nationalists remained Jorda-
nian nationalists, and the monarchy kept representing Jordanianism as well. In November 
1971, King Hussein convened the National Union Conference inviting some 2.500 Tran-
sjordanian and Palestinian representatives. Finally, the conference did not redefine the 
country’s national identity, which is still waiting for a new definition.41 
Conclusion 
The reshaping of the Middle East after World War I, and the creation of the Emirate of 
Transjordan made the possibility for the development of Transjordanian national identity. 
The connection between the state, the Arab Legion and the residents of the country strength-
ened this sense. Emir Abdallah’s Pan-Arab ambitions, however, were about to expand the 
nation well beyond the borders of Jordan. Hence, Pan-Jordanism was born by crossing 
Transjordanian nationalism and the Hashemite Pan-Arbism. 
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Those Palestinians, who had moved to the East Bank after the first Arab-Israeli War, 
became loyal to the Jordanian state and identified th mselves both as Jordanian and Pales-
tinian. Their situation, however, was unclear after the expulsion of PLO because the Jorda-
nian governments were not interested anymore in redefining Jordanian national identity. 
To conclude, Stefanie Nanes emphasises that Palestinians remain an integral part of 
Jordan. The debate over Jordanian national identity is still going on. East Banker Palestini-
ans suggest using another phrase for Jordanianness: Ha hemitism that “may become the 
most viable means for Jordan to a build a political community that includes all of its citi-
zens, regardless of origin”.42 
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Le nationalisme jordanien 
Au 19e siècle, les idéologies développées en Europe ont apparu en Moyen-Orient 
comme une conséquence de la campagne française en Egypte. Pour la fin du 19e siècle, le 
nationalisme arabe est devenu l’idéologie dominante, portant les traits caractères d’un 
mouvement anti-ottoman. Pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, les Arabes s’efforçaient 
d’établir un Califat arabe et ont commencé la révolte arabe contre l’Empire ottoman avec le 
soutien des Forces de l’Entente. Cependant, le Califat ne pouvait pas se réaliser à cause des 
intérêts des Grandes Puissances qui ont réaménagé la carte du Moyen-Orient en établissant 
des nouveaux États arabes. Un des nouveaux États était jus ement la Transjordanie, le man-
dat britannique nouveau-formé avec Émir Abdallah (membre de la dynastie des Hashé-
mites) comme dirigeant de l’État. Émir Abdallah (régnant de 1921 à 1951) a fait un com-
promis pendant les cinq premières années de son règne avec les leaders des tribus locaux et 
il a commencé à créer une nouvelle identité nationale pour la Jordanie avec son ami, l’of-
ficier de l’armée britannique, John Glubb, voulant remplacer l’identité tribale par la nou-
velle identité nationale de la Jordanie. A partir des années 1930, ils ont tenté de promouvoir 
le nationalisme jordanien parmi les arabes palestini ns. L’objectif principal d’Émir Abd-
allah était d’unifier les deux mandats britanniques, la Palestine et la Transjordanie qui a été 
partiellement réalisé après la première guerre israélo- rabe où il pouvait annexer le bord 
d’ouest de la rivière Jourdain. De nombreux Palestiniens ont été forcés de vivre en Jordanie 
dans des camps de réfugiés. Même si les Palestiniens ont reçu la citoyenneté jordanienne et 
les Jordaniens ont tenté de les intégrer dans la société, une lutte idéologique a éclaté entre 
Jordaniens et Palestiniens qui durait jusqu’aux années 1970. Dans ma communication, je 
répondrais à des questions comme : qu’est-ce que le nationalisme jordanien ? Comment 
peut-on le décrire ? Qui est Jordanien ? Quels étaient les événements majeurs de la lutte 
entre Jordaniens et Palestiniens pendant la période en question ?
